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No easy way out: Adorno’s Negativism and 
the Problem of Normativity*
Fabian Freyenhagen (University of Essex)
In this paper, I will address a question that has long overshadowed T.W. Adorno’s critical 
theory, namely, the question of whether or not it is possible to account for normativity within 
his negativistic philosophy. I believe that we can answer this question in the affirmative, but 
in this paper my aim will be more limited. I will clarify the problem and lay out the response 
strategies that are open to those hoping to defend Adorno’s theory. And I will argue that the 
problem cannot be dismissed as easily as is sometimes suggested, namely, by those who claim 
that Adorno’s theory is not normative. 
Adorno has long been criticised for being too negative.1 By subjecting everything to 
critique, he seems to leave himself without a vantage point from which his critique could be 
justified. In particular, the problem is thought to be that Adorno is not able to account for the 
normativity to which he lays claim in his theory, that is, he cannot account for the standards of 
judgement (‘norms’) on which he relies, their force, and the reasons they (supposedly) give us 
(reasons to act,  to believe,  etc.).  Adorno cannot account for normativity,  since this  would 
require  appeal  to  (and thereby knowledge of)  the good (or  the right).  At  least  implicitly, 
accounting for one’s standards of judgement will have to make reference to the good—so that 
when we, for example, say of a sculpture that it is bad we cannot but invoke the idea of a 
good sculpture. However, within Adorno’s negativistic theory, no appeal to (and knowledge 
of) the good (or the right) is possible.2 It is central to Adorno’s negativism that (a) the bad, not 
Fabian Freyenhagen, No easy way out: Adorno's negativism and the Problem of Normativity
the good, is currently realised in our social world, and that (b) we cannot come to know the 
good by conceptual or other means. At the same time, Adorno cannot do without normativity 
in  his  theory.  This  is  so  for  two reasons:  firstly,  Adorno’s  theory  consists  essentially  in 
critique,  and critique (one might  think) is  inevitably normative;  and,  secondly,  his  theory 
contains a number of ethical claims (such as the ‘new categorical  imperative’),3 and these 
claims are also normative. Thus, Adorno seems to be faced with a dilemma: either he gives up 
his negativism, but this would mean losing the substance of his theoretical stance; or he erases 
all traces of normativity from his theory, but then it would lose its status as critique and he 
would have to drop his ethical claims. 
Consequently,  it  seems  as  if  there  is  a  problem  which  affects  the  very  core  of 
Adorno’s theory. Call it the Problem of Normativity. If this problem is not addressed, then his 
theory is subject to a deep-seated contradiction. Thus, it is imperative for those who want to 
defend Adorno to address this problem. 
In order to facilitate the discussion, I propose to formalise the Problem of Normativity 
as follows:4 
(1) Adorno’s theory is normative.
(2) Accounting for normativity requires appeal to (and thereby knowledge of) the good.
(3) Within Adorno’s theory no such appeal (or knowledge) is possible. [Adorno's negativism]
(4) From (2) and (3), Adorno’s theory cannot be normative.
(5) From (1) and (4), Adorno’s theory both is and cannot be normative.
This formalisation brings out clearly the alleged contradictory nature of Adorno’s position. It 
also helps to clarify which options are open to defenders of Adorno’s theory.  They might 
deny one of the three premises (1)-(3), or, alternatively,  they might call  into question the 
inference from premises (2) and (3) to the interim conclusion (4). This suggests that there are 
four possible ways in which to address the Problem of Normativity. 
Firstly, one could argue that Adorno’s theory is not normative after all. This would 
mean  that  premise  (1)  is  false  and  that  the  Problem  of  Normativity  could  be  avoided 
altogether. I entitle this strategy to defend Adorno’s theory the ‘non-normative’ strategy. In 
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the last decade, this strategy or non-normative interpretations of his works more generally 
have  not been represented in  the literature  very much. However,  recently G. Tassone has 
proposed an 'amoral' and non-normative reading of Adorno's theory, though without relating 
this explicitly to the Problem of Normativity as a defence strategy.5
Secondly,  it  is possible to call  into question premise (3) and to claim that we can 
appeal to the good within Adorno’s theory after all, either despite what Adorno says, or in a 
sense which is supposedly compatible with what he says. And if such an appeal is possible, 
then we can account for the normativity of Adorno’s theory in the way demanded by the 
critics. This defence strategy might be called ‘positivistic’ insofar as it involves a violation or 
reinterpretation of Adorno’s negativism. A number of commentators have recently proposed 
interpretations of Adorno's theory according to which this theory is less negativistic than it 
has been traditionally presented. And while not all of these commentators explicitly present 
their readings as a reply to the Problem of Normativity on Adorno's behalf, this problem is 
probably part  of their  underlying motivation.  Among the positivistic  interpretations  in the 
literature, there are a number of variants. Thus, it has been suggested that there is a positive 
core to Adorno’s philosophy either in his conception of contemplation,6 or his understanding 
of emphatic concepts (such as the concept of freedom),7 or in his engagement with authentic 
art,8 or in the value of the experiences we make by attempting to gain ineffable insights.9
Thirdly,  one could defend Adorno by denying premise (2), that is, by denying that 
accounting for normativity requires appeal to (or knowledge of) the good. Doing this would 
be most in keeping with Adorno’s negativism and I,  hence,  entitle  attempts to defend his 
theory in this way ‘negativistic’. There are a number of authors who implicitly or explicitly 
interpret Adorno’s theory in a negativistic way.10 However, until now this interpretation has 
not been developed sufficiently as a response to the Problem of Normativity. It is part of my 
overall project to rectify this.
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Finally,  there  is  the  strategy of  rejecting  that  interim conclusion  (4)  follows  from 
premises  (2)  and  (3).  The  thought  here  is  that  even  if  one  granted  that  an  account  of 
normativity would require appeal to the good, one could maintain that this requirement only 
arises because of the assumption  that  such an account  would have to  take the form of a 
general theory  of  normativity.  Yet,  one  could  then  argue  that  normativity  is  so  context-
dependent  that  a  general  theory  of  normativity  is  both  impossible  and  unnecessary. 
Consequently, it would be unproblematic that within Adorno’s theory one cannot provide an 
account of normativity in the sense just specified. For one cannot fault any theory for lacking 
what is impossible and unnecessary to provide. On this view, the challenge would only be to 
account for each of Adorno’s normative claims locally or in their context. And on this issue, 
there is nothing much informative which can be said about the success or failure of Adorno’s 
normative claims at the general level. Call this the ‘context-dependent’ strategy.11
In this paper, I will mainly argue against the non-normative reading of Adorno (and 
particularly  against  Tassone’s recent  version of it)  and thereby against  the  non-normative 
defence strategy. I will show that it cannot be supported by the text, goes against the spirit of 
Adorno’s critical theory and is mistaken in downgrading the ethical dimension of his theory 
(section I). Moreover, even if Adorno’s method of immanent critique is taken into account, it 
would be misleading to think that this makes his theory non-normative—or so I will argue in 
section II. I will remain agnostic about the other three response strategies—the aim in this 
paper is just to show that there is a genuine problem which needs answering and that this 
problem cannot be dismissed by simply denying that Adorno lays claim to normativity in his 
theory. This negative result will hopefully have the positive upshot of encouraging renewed 
efforts to defend Adorno's theory in other ways.
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Section I: Adorno’s theory  is   normative 
It has been argued that Adorno’s critical theory is not normative. This argument is connected 
with what I have called the non-normative strategy to respond to the Problem of Normativity. 
If  successful,  this  strategy  allows  one  to  dismiss  this  problem  as  missing  the  point  of 
Adorno’s theory. As mentioned above, this strategy is not popular today in the literature, but 
this by itself does not rule it out. I will show in this section that the non-normative strategy is 
unpopular  for  a  good  reason:  to  deny  that  Adorno’s  theory  is  normative  would  be  to 
fundamentally distort it. 
In  the  introduction,  I  mentioned  two  reasons  why one  might  think  that  Adorno’s 
philosophy is normative. On the one hand, Adorno understands theory essentially as critique 
and critique (one might think) is inherently normative; on the other hand, his theory contains 
ethical claims and such claims in turn are normative. Obviously, there is more to say about 
these issues and I will come back to a complication later (in section II).12 Still,  these two 
reasons are a good starting point. Accepting them for the moment, we can identify what a 
non-normative defence of Adorno's theory would have to show in order to be successful. It 
would have to show (1) that Adorno’s theory is merely descriptive or explanatory, not also 
critical, and (2) that it contains no ethical claims.
In fact,  the most recent proponent of a non-normative reading of Adorno’s works, 
Tassone,  argues  explicitly  for  (2)  and  also  seems  to  be  committed  to  (1).  According  to 
Tassone, Adorno holds a purely theoretical and explanatory social theory paired with a an 
equally non-normative philosophy of history; and anything which looks like being an ethical 
or moral judgement in Adorno’s writings is either actually not such a judgement, or is not part 
of Adorno’s theory (but, one presumes, instead merely a matter of his personal opinion).13 If 
anything, Adorno is a critic of morality, who—like Marx before him—denies that morality 
could be an instrument of change (a ‘lever of emancipation’).14 Although Tassone realises that 
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Adorno is  undertaking  ‘projects  of  radical  transformation  of  society’  and  that  implicit  in 
Adorno’s  description  of  society  is  ‘a  moral  indictment’,15 Tassone  thinks  that  Adorno 
ultimately  just  seeks  to  scientifically  explain the  current  social  world  and  its  latent 
potentialities  for change.  Any social  change will  be the  outcome of  a  ‘necessary logical-
conceptual progression’, with ‘practical-normative judgements’ playing no role whatsoever.16 
Even  the  New  Categorical  Imperative  (about  which  I  say  more  shortly)  is  just  the 
phenomenological expression of a contradiction in consciousness, not a moral norm which 
Adorno’s theory prescribes.17
In  reply,  I  will  now  advance  three  interrelated  considerations  against  the  non-
normative reading of Adorno’s theory.  I  will  tailor  the discussion of these considerations 
especially to  Tassone’s account,  but,  I  believe,  that  they speak against  the non-normative 
reading of Adorno’s works more generally. 
Firstly, there is strong textual evidence for thinking that Adorno is not just engaged in 
a merely descriptive or explanatory social theory. If anything, this is clearest in his writings 
on sociology. As early as 1937, in a critique of the sociologist K. Mannheim with the title 
‘Neue wertfreie Soziologie',18 Adorno argues against the very idea of a value-free, merely 
descriptive sociology.  Such sociology fails to be neutral because in the end it justifies the 
status quo.19 Part of the reason for this is that such sociology would involve taking things as 
they are, unreflectively accepting states of affairs or opinions as data. Doing so would miss 
the fundamental  underlying causes and mechanism, which do not directly show up in the 
surface phenomena. To compensate for this, descriptive sociology tends to introduce abstract 
classifications, which, according to Adorno, have little relation to the social reality they are 
meant to describe. The end result of this is that social reality is not grasped, but rather masked 
by being described in terms of invariant categories. In this way, descriptive sociology is not 
just  objectionable  because  it  overlooks  the  ‘necessity  for  criticism’,20 but  also  because  it 
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makes for a bad sociology.21 Adorno held on to these views throughout his life, and defended 
them, for example, against K. Popper and others in a debate about the nature of sociology in 
the 1960s.22 Similarly, in Adorno’s works which are not directly sociological he also rejects 
the  idea  that  theory  should  be  solely  descriptive  or  explanatory.  To  point  to  just  a  few 
examples:  (a)  Adorno  claims  that  to  understand  something  is  already  to  criticise  it,  to 
distinguish what is true and false in it;23 (b) for him, thinking consists essentially in negation;24 
and (c) he argues that critique of ideologies is not peripheral, but central to philosophy.25 That 
critique is essential to Adorno’s conception of theory is perhaps most explicit in his paper 
‘Wozu noch Philosophie’ [1962]. Here, he writes: 
If philosophy is still necessary,  it  is so only in the way it has been from time immemorial: as 
critique, as resistance to the expanding heteronomy, as what might be the powerless attempt of 
thought  to  remain  its  own master  and  to  convict  of  untruth,  by their  own criteria,  fabricated 
mythology and a conniving, resigned conformity.26
In sum, there is ample textual evidence to suggest that Adorno was not engaged in a merely 
descriptive or explanatory project and, in fact,  would have dismissed such a project,  even 
when it comes to social theory.
Secondly,  the  thesis  that  Adorno’s  critical  theory  is  merely  an  explanatory  social 
theory  goes  also  against  the  very  spirit of  his  whole  project.  For  Adorno,  a  merely 
explanatory social theory would be what his long time collaborator M. Horkheimer describes 
as ‘traditional theory’.27 This is a conception of theory, according to which impartial, merely 
descriptive theorising is both possible and represents the ideal form of theorising. Horkheimer 
and Adorno reject this conception in favour of what they call ‘critical theory’. According to 
them, it is an illusion to think that one could engage in impartial and merely descriptive social 
theorising.  Instead  one’s  social  theory  will  always  be  informed  by  an  interest  (at  least 
implicitly).  The important  thing is  not to theorise  independently of any interest  (which is 
impossible), but rather to adopt the right one, namely, the interest in the abolition of suffering 
and injustice.28 This has an important implication. Critical theory always brings standards to 
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bear  on  its  theorising—the  badness  of  suffering  and  injustice  (and  the  interest  in  their 
abolition).29 Hence, critical theory is not just descriptive or explanatory, but always already 
normative in at least the following sense: it uses certain standards of judgements as norms 
with which society (and any theories defending it) can be criticised. Moreover, critical theory 
also  involves  the  demand  for  social  transformation—the  demand,  well  captured  in  a 
formulation  by  Marx,  ‘(…)  to  overthrow  all  circumstances  in  which  man  is  humiliated, 
enslaved,  abandoned  and  despised’.30 This  demand  is  normative  not  just  in  the  sense  of 
providing a standard of judgement,  but also in the further sense of requiring us to act  in 
certain ways. In fact, Adorno’s demand for social transformation often takes the form of an 
ethical or moral demand. For example, consider a central theme in Adorno’s theory, namely, 
Auschwitz and the events for which this name symbolically stands. Adorno aims not just to 
explain the occurrence of Auschwitz (as much as this can be done at all); he demands of us to 
change the circumstances which made Auschwitz possible and which still largely persist. In a 
key passage, Adorno claims that ‘[a] new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler 
upon human beings in the state of their unfreedom: to arrange their thoughts and actions so 
that  Auschwitz  will  not  repeat  itself,  so  that  nothing  similar  will  happen’.31 This  New 
Categorical Imperative would require detailed analysis—for there are a number of unusual 
aspects to it (such as the fact that is imposed by Hitler rather than self-legislated or demanded 
by  reason).32 Nonetheless,  one  thing  is  clear:  this  imperative  demonstrates  that  Adorno's 
theory is not merely explanatory, but results in ethical demands for social transformation and, 
therefore, is deeply normative.
Thirdly, this last point also shows that the ethical demands which Adorno makes are 
not just a matter of his personal opinion, but integral to his theory.  It is not that the New 
Categorical  Imperative  arrives  as  an  after-thought  or  optional  extra  in  Adorno’s  theory. 
Rather, to understand his analysis  of the evils of Auschwitz and how modern society and 
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culture is deeply implicated in them is to accept that  we should arrange our thoughts and 
actions  differently;  the  evils  of  Auschwitz  and  the  failure  of  culture  thus  analysed 
categorically demand  that  we should  aim to  prevent  that  something  similar  can  happen. 
Equally with other ethical claims which Adorno makes: it is not the case that we need an extra 
step from the analysis of something as a form of wrong life to the demand that we should 
resist  it;  for  Adorno this  ‘negative  prescription’  derives  directly  from life  being  wrong.33 
Hence, his descriptions and explanations are already ethically loaded. Thus, whether or not 
one agrees with those commentators who think that Adorno’s theory contains an ethics, one 
ought to agree that an ethical dimension is not accidental to, or separate from, it. There is a 
direct  line  from  Adorno’s  conception  of  theory  as  critique  to  his  demands  for  social 
transformation; and, insofar as many of these demands are ethical in nature (most prominently 
the New Categorical Imperative), an ethical dimension is indispensable to his theory. 
Moreover, it would be a serious confusion to take the fact that Adorno is critical of 
morality and moral philosophy to mean that his theory cannot contain any ethical or moral 
claims. To give an analogy, B. Williams is very critical of moral systems in that he rejects 
modern, principle-based morality and aims to restrict the role of ethical theory in everyday 
life.34 Yet,  no  one  would  want  to  say  that  Williams’s  philosophy  is  devoid  of  ethical 
normativity. In a similar way, one should not conflate Adorno’s critical views about morality 
and moral philosophy with a denial of all ethical or moral claims.35 Admittedly, Adorno is 
sceptical  about  the  possibility  of  living  rightly  in  our  current  wrong social  world  (as  he 
famously writes, ‘[w]rong life cannot be lived rightly’).36 And he is also sceptical about the 
possibility that moral theory could change that.37 Yet, this scepticism does not stop him from 
putting forward ethical demands on how we should live our wrong lives, such as the already 
mentioned ‘negative prescription’ to resist ‘(…) the forms of wrong life which have been seen 
through and critically dissected by the most progressive minds’.38 Such negative prescriptions 
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might not add up to a full-blown morality or be part of a systematic moral theory, but, again, 
there is no need to think that ethics would have to take either of these forms (think back to the 
analogy with Williams). Finally, even if it was true that Adorno did not consider morality as a 
successful ‘lever of emancipation’ (and I am far from certain that it is true), this need not 
mean that he made no ethical or moral claims. It would only mean that he did not consider the 
ethical  claims he made to have much practical  effect  on people.  However,  Adorno never 
accepted  that  the  adequacy  of  a  theory  should  be  measured  by  its  practical  effects.39 
Moreover, if the social conditions are such that they give rise to ethical demands to change 
them,  then  this  is  unaffected  by  the  putative  fact  that  morality  or  ethics  are  unsuitable 
instruments of social change. If anything, this putative fact would constitute a moral calamity 
in its own right: there would be an ethical demand, but ethics would be powerless to effect 
that this demand is met. Hence, there is nothing in Adorno’s critique of moral philosophy 
which makes it the case that his critical theory cannot be ethical. 
For these reasons, the non-normative reading should be rejected and we should agree 
with the critics of Adorno that his theory is normative. This also spells trouble for the non-
normative  defence  strategy  to  the  Problem  of  Normativity.  Admittedly,  those  defending 
Adorno might have to give up some of what he says, but a non-normative defence would have 
to give up too much of it. 
However, this does not yet settle the matter. One might admit that Adorno’s theory is 
normative and still reject that he owes us an account of this normativity. Next, I will discuss 
one reason for why one might reject this. I will show that this reason is, in fact, not a good 
reason for doing so.
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Section II: The limitations of immanent critique
It could be argued that Adorno’s theory mainly takes the form of immanent critiques, meaning 
that Adorno mainly took the standards or ideals implicit in society (or theories defending it) 
and criticised society (and those theories) with the help of their own standards and ideals. 
Such a method need not involve independent  endorsement  of the claims made use in the 
critique of a position. For example, to criticise bourgeois society for not living up to its ideals 
of freedom and equality would be compatible with not actually endorsing these ideals. 
In this way, one might think, Adorno’s theory can be normative, but does not owe us 
an  account of  this  normativity.  The  normativity  would  derive  from within  his  immanent 
critique and, if anyone, those Adorno criticises (such as Kant) need to account for it (and if 
they could not do so, then this would be a problem for them, not for Adorno). 
As a rejoinder, I will now raise doubts about the idea that Adorno’s method absolves 
him from having to give his own account of normativity. I agree that Adorno largely criticises 
positions immanently (or, at least, aims to do so). Yet, crucially, Adorno does not think that 
immanent critique can be solely immanent.40 This is especially so, when it comes to criticising 
the social world of late capitalism. Adorno became increasingly sceptical about the possibility 
of immanent critique of the current social  order. He points out that  confronting bourgeois 
society  with  its  moral  norms  might  just  lead  to  these  norms  being  dropped,  rather  than 
realised.41 In  fact,  he  seems  to  think  that  these  norms  (and  other  ideals  used  to  justify 
capitalism) had, indeed, been largely dropped by the middle of the twentieth century, so that it 
is no longer possible to confront the given reality with the claims it makes about itself. For 
example, he writes: ‘There is not a crevice in the cliff of the established order into which the 
ironist might hook a fingernail’.42 Thus, Adorno suggests that there is no longer a discrepancy 
between what  the  social  world  presents  itself  to  realise  (its  ideals)  and  its  actual  reality. 
Without  such  a  discrepancy,  immanent  critique  cannot  get  going.  Moreover,  even  where 
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immanent  critique  is  still  possible,  Adorno  is  not  only  concerned  with  demanding  the 
realisation of what the bourgeoisie had promised.43 Rather, the current state of the world is 
bad for Adorno, whether or not it cloaks itself in positive claims. We know inhumanity and 
misery by themselves,44 and by themselves they demand their abolition.45 In fact, in order to 
undertake adequate immanent critiques we have to be guided in them by knowledge of the 
bad and of the fact that our current society realises the bad.46 Otherwise, immanent critiques 
just turn into instances of false consciousness.47 Consequently,  we are back with the point 
which  I  already raised  about  Adorno’s  critical  theory:  this  theory  presupposes  normative 
premises of its own. In this sense, Adorno cannot rely on immanent critique alone, but brings 
into it the knowledge of the bad and the inhuman as well as the interest in their abolition. And 
to underwrite this knowledge and interest Adorno needs an account of the normativity they 
contain—something which his critics would argue is impossible within his negativistic theory. 
Whether or not the critics are right about this, one thing is certain: the fact that Adorno mainly 
relies on immanent critiques does not absolve him from providing an account of normativity. 
Either this form of critique is altogether impossible today, or, insofar as immanent critique is 
still possible, it relies on normative assumptions brought to it from the outside.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have concentrated on clarifying the Problem of Normativity and on showing 
that it is a genuine problem insofar as it cannot simply be dismissed out of hand, as those who 
advance the non-normative reading of Adorno’s theory tend to suggest (section I). In fact, as I 
have  also  argued (in  section  II),  even  Adorno’s  reliance  on immanent  critiques  does  not 
absolve him from providing an account of the normativity contained in his theory.  In this 
sense, the question put to those defending Adorno still stands: 'can Adorno account for the 
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normativity of his critical stance and ethical demands without giving up on his negativism?' 
Instead of answering this  question, my main point in this paper was merely to argue that 
those, who like me, think that this question can be answered in the affirmative should not 
deny that Adorno’s theory is normative. What looks like an easy way out of the Problem of 
Normativity is actually not a solution at all. 
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